| dc.description.abstract | The Robot Operating System (ROS) is a popular open-source middleware widely used in the
robotics community. While ROS provides extensive support for robotic application develop-
ment, it lacks certain fundamental security features, making ROS-based systems vulnerable to
attacks that can compromise the application and user security. To address these challenges,
ROS incorporates security plugins and libraries to protect against unauthorized access and en-
sure secure communication between ROS applications. However, these user-level security tools
do not protect end-to-end information flow against operating system (OS)-level attacks.
This research introduces FlowROS, a decentralized information flow control (DIFC) system
for ROS. FlowROS empowers ROS applications with fine-grained control over their sensitive
information, providing a programmable interface and supporting explicit label propagation for
modified ROS applications. FlowROS also leverages implicit label propagation for backward
compatibility with unmodified ROS applications while guaranteeing end-to-end information
flow control, including secrecy and integrity requirements. The implementation of FlowROS
includes a kernel-level enforcement engine based on Linux security modules (LSM) to intercept
sensitive communications within the system.
The contributions of this research include identifying the limitations of mandatory access
control (MAC)-based policy frameworks in ROS, motivating the need for DIFC systems in
robotics platforms, presenting FlowROS as a practical DIFC solution for ROS applications,
addressing the inherent DIFC challenge in ROS, and demonstrating the robustness, security,
and performance of FlowROS through case studies, evaluations, and practical policies.
Overall, FlowROS enhances the security of ROS-based systems by providing ROS applica-
tions explicit control over the flow of their sensitive information, mitigating vulnerabilities, and
protecting against accidental data disclosure. | en_US |
